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Munich, 31 March 2006
Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Prop-
erty, Competition and Tax Law (Munich)
on the DG Competition discussion paper of December 2005 on the applica-
tion of Article 82 of the EC Treaty to exclusionary abuses
The Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law
is a research institute within the Max Planck Society for the Advancement of
Science. With its expertise in these areas of law, and an emphasis on com-
parative analysis, it takes the economic and technological aspects of the law
into account. The Max Planck Institute contributes to answering fundamen-
tal legal questions, and provides impulses for legal developments on the
national, European and international levels.
The Max Planck Institute hereby submits its comments on the DG Competi-
tion discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the EC Treaty to
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exclusionary abuses.1 Although some remarks will be made on the general
analytical framework envisaged for exclusionary abuses, the focus of these
comments will be on the Commission’s approach to exclusionary abuses
involving intellectual property rights.
I. GENERAL REMARKS
1. The Max Planck Institute welcomes the Commission’s initiative to give
guidance on the application of the competition rules on abuse of domi-
nance. It also supports the Commission’s endeavour to ensure a con-
sistent competition policy throughout the different areas of competition
law. The discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the EC
Treaty to exclusionary abuses is embedded in the broader reform
process of the EC competition rules, which advocates an increased fo-
cus on the likely economic effects on the relevant market2 and which
has already been implemented in the field of Article 81 EC Treaty on
anti-competitive agreements and in merger control. Simultaneously,
the Commission has to respect the case-law of the European courts3
and the overall interest in legal certainty. The following comments take
these factors into account as the basis of their analytical framework.
However, since the discussion paper has to be considered only as an
initial step for developing principles for the Commission’s application of
Art. 82 EC to exclusionary abuses, the Max Planck Institute deems it
wise to broaden the scope of discussion to include an evaluation of the
1 These comments were authored by a project group consisting of Prof. Dr. Josef
Drexl, Dr. Beatriz Conde Gallego, Dr. Stefan Enchelmaier, Dr. Matthias Leistner
and Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt. Professor Dr. Reto M. Hilty supports these com-
ments. Professor Dr. J. Straus could not participate in the preparation of this
Statement and could also not be consulted on short notice due to his overseas
stay.
2 Para. 4 Discussion Paper.
3 Paras. 5 and 7 Discussion Paper.
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soundness of both the approach of the Commission in the discussion
paper and the case-law of the European courts.
2. The Max Planck Institute welcomes the Commission’s approach of
dealing with exclusionary practices as only one category of abusive
behaviour in the sense of Art. 82 EC.4 Protection against exploitative
practices, in particular, is characteristic of European competition law
and distinguishes it from the U.S. practice relating to Sec. 2 Sherman
Act (monopolization). The objectives of European competition law must
not be reduced to enhancing aggregate welfare (efficiency)5 in the
sense of economic theory. It also protects the economic freedom of
market agents and the interest in economic integration and strives for
the participation of consumers in the benefits of competition (advocat-
ing a consumer surplus standard as opposed to an aggregate welfare
standard).
II. ASSESSMENT OF EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES INVOLVING IPRS: REFUSAL TO LI-
CENSE IPRS
3. The discussion paper deals with refusals to license within the more
general framework of refusals to supply. However, the Commission
fails to explain why the general requirements developed for refusal-to-
supply cases would be an appropriate approach to refusals to license.
The Max Planck Institute is aware of the fact that the ECJ also refers to
this concept. Still, we have doubts as to the soundness of that ap-
4 Para. 3 Discussion Paper.
5 The notion of aggregate welfare is preferred in these comments to that of “con-
sumer welfare”. The notion of consumer welfare is open to misunderstanding. According to
the Chicago School, a certain behaviour that reduces the level of competition, but increases
productive efficiency in favour of the undertaking only, i.e., without transferring benefits to
consumers in the sense of Art. 81(3) EC, would be considered as increasing “consumer
welfare”. In order to underline the difference, we use the notion of “consumer surplus stan-
dard” when we talk about the approach of Art. 81(3) EC.
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proach, at least in some cases. In the following we will therefore look at
the overall relationship between IPRs and recommend building on the
common goal of the two fields of law of promoting dynamic competition
in developing a consistent approach to refusal to license (below A.). In
the light of this analysis we will then evaluate the approach of the dis-
cussion paper of relying on general concepts for refusal-to-supply
cases also for the assessment of a refusal to license (below B.). Based
on the concept of dynamic competition, we will propose a different ap-
proach (below C.). It is our feeling that in specific situations the ap-
proach proposed by the discussion paper and our approach will usually
reach identical results. However, we think that our approach is more
consistent with the economics of IPRs. Our approach tries to assess
the specific effects of an IPR on a given market by balancing its pro-
and anti-competitive effects and would therefore provide more legal
certainty for the application of Art. 82 EC. Finally, (below D.), we will
comment on specific considerations of the discussion paper. This last
part would be particularly helpful for the Commission if it decided to
maintain its overall approach to refusal-to-license situations.
A. Complementary goals of IPRs and competition law and the con-
cept of dynamic competition
4. In order to develop a sound approach to refusal-to-license cases, the
Commission would be well-advised to look at the effects of a given in-
tellectual property right on a market. Such effects of intellectual prop-
erty rights are very specific and complex and require a thorough analy-
sis. The discussion paper, in contrast, equates intellectual property
rights with an input – similar to any other resources for production –
and thereby risks losing sight of the specific economics of IPRs.
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5. As the Commission itself explains in the Technology Transfer Guide-
lines, there is no fundamental conflict between IPRs and competition
law. On the contrary, they share the common goal of promoting dy-
namic competition.6 The Commission, in this context, describes this
modern view of the relationship of IPRs and competition law in most
appropriate terms: “Intellectual property rights promote dynamic com-
petition by encouraging undertakings to invest in developing new or
improved products and processes. So does competition by putting
pressure on undertakings to innovate. Therefore, both intellectual
property rights and competition are necessary to promote innovation
and ensure a competitive exploitation thereof.” It is recommended that
the Commission build on and further develop this theory of comple-
mentarity for the application of Art. 82 EC.
6. Such analysis could distinguish between two different forms of compe-
tition: Intellectual property rights exclude competition “by imitation”,
which can be expressed economically as a loss of allocative efficiency.
However, such exclusion triggers competition “by substitution” for bet-
ter, more innovative products – and thereby promotes dynamic effi-
ciency. In this sense, a patent, for instance, only grants “legal exclusiv-
ity” to the extent that it excludes imitation. But it does not necessarily
result in an economic monopoly. In a given case, different products
that may be protected by patents each can compete in the same mar-
ket. Even a patent that results in a market-dominant position today may
be thrown from the throne tomorrow by a patent for a more innovative
product. In this view, undertakings investing in innovation protected by
patents often compete “for” the markets, and not necessarily in a given
market.
6 Para. 7 Commission Notice – Guidelines on the application of Art. 81 of the Treaty
to technology transfer agreements; OJ EC 2004 No. C 101, p. 2.
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7. From these considerations, we may draw general conclusions as to the
most appropriate approach to Art. 82 EC:
(a) Any application of Art. 82 EC to exclusionary practices should
clearly distinguish between the general concepts of allocative efficiency
and dynamic competition and should refer to this distinction when it
comes to the treatment of refusal-to-supply cases. In contrast, the dis-
cussion paper in its introductory parts mostly refers to concepts of allo-
cative efficiency only and combines this concept in unspecific ways
with a concept of promoting innovation.7 In this context, it would be
wise to be more explicit about the concept of dynamic competition,
which in fact plays a major role when the discussion paper looks at re-
fusal-to-license situations. Building on the concept of dynamic competi-
tion would be very helpful for developing a consistent approach to re-
fusal to license, whereas the concepts applied to refusal to supply have
greatly been developed for models depicting allocative efficiency only
and may therefore be insufficient to translate the concept of dynamic
competition into an adequate application of Art. 82 EC to refusal to li-
cense.
(b) The general concept of exclusionary practices should also be the
starting point for the approach to refusal-to-license cases. However, it
is insufficient to simply ask whether there is a detrimental effect on
“competition” on a given – downstream – market.8 The question rather
relates to the impact of a refusal to license on competition by imitation
and competition by substitution. This distinction is most important.
Whereas, in theory, the IP system allows substitution, such substitution
may be hindered by the exclusivity of the IPR.9 A duty to license based
7 Para. 4 Discussion Paper.
8 See para. 222 Discussion Paper.
9 The Magill case provides a good example: Refusal to license the copyright in TV
program listings protected inferior products from competition by more innovative products,
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on Art. 82 EC would react to such failure of the IP system. In other
cases – e.g., de jure or de facto standardisation of products – substitu-
tion may be impossible or highly unlikely. In such cases, one must ask
whether Art. 82 EC should even allow imitation, so as to guarantee at
least allocative efficiency. In both scenarios, the refusal to license has
an exclusionary effect. However, it is of utmost importance whether the
duty to license aims at guaranteeing competition by substitution or
competition by imitation.
(c) We think that the general economic approach to competition law
that assesses the effects of a given conduct in the relevant market is
also appropriate for the analysis of IP-related cases in the framework
of Art. 82 EC. In contrast, the approach of the ECJ, as recently further
developed in the IMS Health judgment, that tries to legally balance the
exclusivity of the intellectual property right on the one hand and the in-
terest in protecting free competition on the other,10 seems to believe in
an inherent conflict between the two fields of law and, therefore, fails to
develop a consistent analysis of the economic effects of a given right
on competition in the relevant market.
8. The discussion paper uses the term of intellectual property rights with-
out further specification. However, intellectual property rights protect
different subject-matter, pursue diverging objectives and apply different
techniques.
(a) In contrast to the discussion paper, the Technology Transfer Block
Exemption Regulation (TTBER) is limited to IPRs relating to technol-
ogy, namely patent and software licenses. We do not argue, however,
that guidelines on the application of Art. 82 EC should likewise be lim-
namely comprehensive TV guides; see Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE
and ITP v. Commission, [1995] ECR I-743.
10 Case C-418/01, IMS Health, [2004] ECR I-5039, para. 48.
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ited to “technology”. The concept of dynamic competition can also be
applied to trade marks and copyrights. Trade marks provide informa-
tion to customers and allow them to distinguish between different
goods and services of different right holders in a given market.
Thereby, competition between trade mark owners engenders invest-
ment in the quality of goods. National copyright laws pursue a whole
range of economic, social and cultural objectives. Still, all copyright
laws in the EU have one thing in common: they are meant to give in-
centives for creativity.
(b) In addition, there is a need for a broader approach to Art. 82 EC,
covering all IPRs. In particular, the ECJ has so far had to develop its
case-law on refusal to license outside the narrow area of technology,
namely via cases dealing with design protection (Volvo) and copyright
protection for TV listings (Magill) and for data bases (IMS Health).
However, we recommend a cautious approach to transposing the pat-
ent/innovation paradigm to the copyright/creativity world. With regard to
creativity, one has to take into account the fact that creativity in the
classical copyright field – music, literature and art – still has to rely on
the individual author who is not motivated exclusively by economic in-
terests.
(c) However, a pure efficiency approach would reduce copyright law to
an instrument for satisfying existing consumer demand in a given mar-
ket, whereas, from the view of cultural policy, copyright law is expected
to produce “innovative” and “progressive” creations that may be re-
jected by the market at the beginning, but prove to be most important
for future-oriented cultural pluralism and creativity. Although we do not
recommend excluding copyright as such, the Commission should work
on an “economic approach” to copyright that takes into account the
specific dynamic aspect of the creative process that distinguishes
copyrights from patents. Likewise, the Commission should respect the
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decision of many domestic legislatures to protect the creator as the ini-
tial right holder, as the source of creative activity. A creativity-oriented
theory of markets for copyrighted works is currently most needed in the
ongoing restructuring of the European system of collecting societies,
where the Commission plays a major role by applying competition rules
to such societies.
B. Evaluating the application of the general approach to refusal to
supply to IP-related cases
9. Based on the foregoing considerations, we analyse the overall ap-
proach of the discussion paper dealing with refusal to license within the
general framework of criteria on refusal to supply.
10. The discussion paper intends to capture cases of refusal to license by
defining the intellectual property right as an input needed by a competi-
tor for entering a different, however, related market. In such circum-
stances, refusal to license would have to be considered an abuse of a
dominant position, provided that the refusal excludes the petitioner of
the right from participating in the economic activity in the downstream
product market (vertical foreclosure).11 This approach is in line with the
case-law of the ECJ. In IMS Health, the ECJ, following earlier deci-
sions, required that the refusal to license exclude competition in a sec-
ondary market.12 Since the right holder refused to license at all – and
not only to some competitors – the Court argued that a potential or
even a hypothetical market for the IPR would be sufficient. Whereas
we do not deny that in some cases this approach might be useful for
capturing refusal-to-license cases, especially in situations of discrimi-
natory licensing and of termination of licensing agreements, we do not
11 Para. 209 Discussion Paper.
12 Case C-418/01, IMS Health, [2004] ECR I-5039, para. 40 ss.
10 of 24
think that the principles of “refusal to start supplying an input”, as of-
fered in the discussion paper,13 constitute a sound approach to refusal-
to-license cases.
11. As to “refusal to start supplying” cases, the Commission correctly re-
quires market dominance on an upstream or a related market that
might be used to restrict competition in another market.14 In the dis-
cussion paper, the Commission does not explain in which circum-
stances such market dominance would exist in an IP case. In fact, one
would have to require that the right holder had a dominant position in
the “potential” or “hypothetical” market for the IP license and was trying
to restrict competition on the downstream product market by refusing to
license. By singling out the market for a license as a proper market,
this approach presumes that the IP right as such confers market domi-
nance. This, however, may be true in some cases, but not in others. In
the famous Magill case of the ECJ, the copyright in TV listings as such
conferred market power to the TV stations by allowing them to control
access to the necessary information as the subject-matter of protec-
tion.15 This information could not be substituted by any other informa-
tion and, because of this, became a necessary input for the marketing
of a comprehensive TV guide on the downstream product market. In
the IMS Health case, in contrast, market dominance of the right holder
did not exist in the potential market for the subject-matter protected by
the IP right, but only in the market for the service of collecting informa-
tion on the sale of pharmaceuticals. Despite the copyright of the right
holder, the petitioner was able to develop its own system (brick struc-
ture) for collecting such information. However, it was unable to enter
13 Para. 225 et seq. Discussion Paper.
14 Para. 226 Discussion Paper.
15 Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v. Commission, [1995]
ECR I-743.
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the service market with this structure since it could not convince the
pharmaceutical companies to apply a different system for collecting in-
formation because of the switching costs such a migration would have
entailed.16 Of course, the copyright owned by IMS Health did play a
major role in foreclosing the product market. However, this does not
change the conclusion that this was only so because of the specific cir-
cumstances in that market.
12. Accordingly, the distinction of two separate markets and the application
of a refusal-to-supply analysis only makes sense in a situation in which
the IP right itself produces market dominance irrespective of the mar-
ket conditions on the downstream product market. This was so in the
Magill case because the copyright itself excluded access to indispen-
sable information. Such scenarios are characterised by an inherent de-
ficiency of the IP system. In such situations, repairing the IP system –
i.e., excluding copyright protection for information – would be prefer-
able to the application of competition law. However, in this case the
ECJ had to accept national copyright law and was only able to react to
the IP deficiency and to reach a pro-competitive outcome by interven-
ing on the basis of Art. 82 EC.
13. Since IPRs as such do not confer market dominance on the right
holder,17 the issue of whether there is market dominance on an up-
stream potential IP market needs careful consideration. In situations in
which the IP system is not deficient, but competition would be re-
stricted on a product market without the license because of specific ex-
ternal market conditions, the IP right only confers market dominance
16 Para. 229 of the Discussion Paper takes such switching costs, obviously relating to
the IMS Health case, as an argument for the indispensability of the IP right. Thereby, the
Commission, like the ECJ, disregards the fact that such indispensability explains only mar-
ket dominance on the downstream product market, but not on the upstream market for sub-
ject-matter protected by the IP right.
17 Acknowledged by the Commission in para. 40, 1st indent, of the Discussion Paper
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for that product market. Consequently, the refusal-to-supply analysis
advocated by the Commission cannot be applied. In IMS Health, the
ECJ did not notice this fundamental difference, but simply required that
the copyright be an indispensable input for doing business in the ser-
vice market.18 Thereby, the Court overlooked the fact that IMS Health
did not have market dominance in the market for the subject-matter
protected by the IP right, but only on the service market itself. Such a
conclusion, however, does not mean that Art. 82 EC may not be ap-
plied. Since there is market dominance in the relevant market, the
question still remains under which circumstances a refusal to license
has to be considered an abuse. The analysis has to be based on the
effect of the exclusive IP right on the incentive structure for innovation
in the given market and the loss of allocative efficiency caused by ex-
cluding competition by imitation. In fact, the distinction between two dif-
ferent markets in IMS Health was in no way helpful in answering the vi-
tal question of whether Art. 82 EC intervention in the exclusive right
may be justified.
14. Although a refusal-to-supply analysis may be applied in some cases,
this does not mean that such an analysis is the best approach to re-
fusal-to-license scenarios. Even in Magill the question still was whether
an exception can be accepted to the exclusivity of the IP right under
Art. 82 EC. To solve the problem, the ECJ developed the new-product
rule. Accordingly, the discussion paper also argues that the general
test for refusal-to-supply cases would be insufficient in IP-related cases
and, therefore, requires an “additional condition”.19 Neither the ECJ nor
the discussion paper offers a consistent “economic” reason for the ad-
ditional condition. In fact, requiring it proves that the general test is in-
sufficient and a better test could be developed. This other test would
18 Case C-418/01, IMS Health, [2004] ECR I-5039, paras. 45-47.
19 Para. 237 Discussion Paper.
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have to be based on the economic effects of the IP right on the given
market, taking into account, in particular, effects on dynamic competi-
tion.
15. The “indispensability” requirement of the Commission’s approach20 has
to be considered a most important element for any approach to the ap-
plication of Art. 82 EC to intellectual property. So long as substitution is
possible, e.g. by “inventing around” a patent, the IP system works and
the exclusivity of the IP right should not be touched. The Commission
is right in pointing out that the IP right may have to be considered in-
dispensable in situations in which the protected technology has be-
come the standard21 or where interoperability with the right holder’s
product is necessary for a company to enter or remain in the market.22
The indispensability test is not specific to the general refusal-to-supply
analysis. It may also be included in a different, IP-oriented test for the
application of Art. 82 EC. However, whether access to the subject-
matter of protection is indispensable can only be decided in view of the
effects of the IP right on the given market. Therefore, a more thorough
approach is required.
16. As to the requirement of the likely market-distorting foreclosure effect,
the discussion paper argues that the elimination of competition on the
downstream market would not be an absolutely necessary require-
ment, but rather prefers a concept of a distorting effect as compared to
the earlier level of competition.23 Again, the discussion paper does not
20 Paras. 228-230 Discussion Paper.
21 In a standardisation situation, the German Federal Supreme Court in the Standard
Tight-Head Drum Case recognised a duty to license a patent based on § 20(1) German Act
Against Restraints of Competition, only a few months after the IMS Health judgment of the
ECJ; see Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) of 13 July 2004, [2005] IIC 742 –
Standard Tight-Head Drum (English translation).
22 Para. 230 Discussion Paper.
23 Paras. 231-233 Discussion Paper.
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appear sufficiently specific on IP-related cases. First, the discussion
paper is not in line with the IMS Health judgement, where the ECJ ex-
plicitly required full elimination of competition in the downstream mar-
ket.24 Secondly and more importantly, the discussion paper does not
distinguish between the effect on competition by substitution and com-
petition by imitation. This is exactly where the discussion paper fails to
pick up the concept of dynamic competition. A market-distorting fore-
closure effect, as required by the discussion paper, can also be pro-
duced by the refusal to license to the competitor who only intends to
imitate. By not making the distinction, the Commission reduces the
analytical framework to a traditional neoclassical approach that only
looks at allocative efficiency. Whether a mere reduction of competition
by imitation – and a loss in allocative efficiency – justifies an exception
to the exclusivity of the IP right is the question that needs to be an-
swered in the first place. Therefore, an approach that analyses the ef-
fects of a refusal to license on the two types of competition would be
much better suited to capture IP-related competition problems.
17. Beyond the general approach, the discussion paper proposes an addi-
tional condition for the application of Art. 82 EC to refusal-to-license
cases. In doing so, the discussion paper sticks closely to arguments
made by the ECJ in its case-law (Volvo, Magill, IMS Health) and finally
adopts the new-product rule developed by the ECJ in Magill and IMS
Health. Whereas in IMS Health, the ECJ clarified that the “prevention
of the emergence of a new product” has to be considered a “cumula-
tive” requirement,25 the Commission seems to take this test as a mere
“example” of exceptional circumstances that justify a duty to license.26
In contrast to the general “economic” approach that relies on the ef-
24 Case C-418/01, IMS Health, [2004] ECR I-5039, para. 47.
25 Case C-418/01, IMS Health, [2004] ECR I-5039, para. 38.
26 Para 239 Discussion Paper.
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fects of a given behaviour on the relevant market, the approach of the
ECJ in IMS Health is based on a legal balancing. The IP right and the
freedom of its owner not to license are taken as a given legal decision
that can only be outweighed by the interest in free competition if the
petitioner intends to offer a new product and thereby contribute to the
development of the secondary market, to the advantage of consum-
ers.27
18. The question remains whether the additional condition of the preven-
tion of the emergence of a new product appropriately translates the
concept of dynamic competition for the application of Art. 82 EC. In
fact, the new-product criterion seems to reflect the concept of competi-
tion by substitution. According to this reading, Art. 82 EC would apply
in situations in which the refusal to license – in contrast to dynamic
competition – excludes competition by substitution. In conformity with
the theory of complementarity, Art. 82 EC would guarantee dynamic
competition in situations in which the IP law alone unexpectedly ex-
cludes substitution instead of creating incentives for competitors to in-
vest in innovation. This approach worked perfectly well in the Magill
case, in which the copyright allowed the TV stations to control informa-
tion on their programs and excluded a comprehensive TV guide as a
more competitive product from the market.
19. The question also remains whether there are cases in which Art. 82 EC
may also be applied in order to enable competitors to imitate. We rec-
ommend that the Commission should carefully consider this question.
Only a few weeks after the IMS Health judgment, the German Federal
Supreme Court applied rules of German competition law on abuse of
market dominance to allow a competitor to use a patent for an inven-
27 Case C-418/01, IMS Health, [2004] ECR I-5039, para. 48 et seq.
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tion that had been accepted as the industry standard.28 The Court in
this decision clearly relied on the concept of dynamic competition, ac-
cording to which competition by imitation is excluded in order to pro-
mote competition by substitution.29 According to the Court, the law has
to take into account that in standardisation cases the market would not
accept a more innovative product. The only way to compete with the
patent holder is to imitate the standardised, patent-protected product.
In its decision, the German Federal Supreme Court reacts to a situa-
tion which, so far, has not been brought before the ECJ. In the light of
the new-product rule of IMS Health it seems questionable whether the
ECJ would ever apply Art. 82 EC in order to allow imitation. The Com-
mission, in contrast, is right in alluding to situations in which a technol-
ogy protected by an IP right has become a standard.30 German case-
law demonstrates that, in standardisation cases in particular, a duty to
license with the objective of allowing imitation should not be excluded
in principle.
C. Proposal for a different approach
20. Notwithstanding the case-law of the ECJ, we deem it wise to launch a
discussion on a specific IP-related test for the application of Art. 82 EC.
This test should rely on the theory of complementarity and look at the
specific effects of the IP right in the relevant market with regard to
competition by substitution and competition by imitation.
21. The first requirement would be the answer to the question of whether
the right holder has market dominance in a given market. In particular,
in cases in which the right holder has not licensed to anyone but
28 See footnote 21.
29 See footnote 21, p. 746.
30 Para. 230 Discussion Paper.
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serves the product market himself, market dominance will most likely
exist in the product market only. Whether market dominance exists has
to be assessed carefully. Market dominance can arise from the techno-
logical superiority of the protected subject-matter or from additional, ex-
ternal market circumstances such as standardisation.
22. Secondly, a refusal to license can only be considered abusive in cases
in which the basic mechanism of dynamic competition with a view to
promoting innovation by substitution does not work. Therefore, Art. 82
EC can only be applied if substitution is excluded. Whether substitution
is possible or not will regularly depend on the facts. In particular, in
cases of de facto standards, e.g. those based on network effects in a
given market, the analysis would require difficult predictions as to the
stability of such a standard, i.e., as to whether and when the standard
might be overthrown by superior technology. In contrast to a situation
in which substitution is excluded, a merely very “successful” technol-
ogy, one that gives rise to market dominance because it is technologi-
cally unlikely that it will have to face competition from superior technol-
ogy in the foreseeable future, does not raise competition concerns. Ac-
cordingly, a distinction has to be made between merely “successful”
and “indispensable” IPRs. Both may give rise to market dominance, but
only the latter may justify intervention under Art. 82 EC. In legal terms,
this second requirement is to be phrased as an “indispensability test”,
since the petitioner will only be able to develop economic activity in the
same market if the license is granted.
23. However, indispensability alone does not justify application of Art. 82
EC. In a third step, it will be necessary to assess the pro- and anti-
competitive effects of a duty to license in the light of the concept of dy-
namic competition. In general terms, a licence would be justified when-
ever it would enable substitution by a different, potentially more innova-
tive product. In such a situation, only the duty to license can guarantee
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that the expected advantage of dynamic competition is attained. How-
ever, the duty to license might act as a counter-incentive to the right
holder’s initial investment for innovation . In such cases, the amount of
royalties to be paid for the license must be sufficiently high to respond
adequately to those negative effects.
24. In cases in which substitution is not possible, e.g. standardisation, ap-
plication of Art. 82 EC requires a much more thorough analysis of the
exclusionary effect of the refusal to license. In such situations, the ad-
vantage of the IP system of triggering dynamic competition between
undertakings seems unattainable. Still, competition by imitation is ex-
cluded and consumers have to pay higher prices because of a loss of
allocative efficiency. In this regard, the ECJ advocates a very narrow
view of what benefits consumers.31 Consumers are not only interested
in getting better products (dynamic competition); they are also and very
much interested in price competition (allocative efficiency). Exclusion of
imitation harms consumers when substitution is not possible. Neverthe-
less, a duty to license to the imitator may produce negative effects on
the overall incentive structure of the IP system. If an investor foresees
that he will have to share his innovation with competitors, he might be
less willing to make the initial investment when competing for the mar-
ket.32 On the other hand, the Commission rightly points out that access
to the input induces a greater number of companies to invest in follow-
on research and development,33 whereas otherwise follow-on innova-
tion could only be expected from the incumbent right –holder, who
does not feel the pressure of competition.
31 Case C-418/01, IMS Health, I-5039, para. 48.
32 In the same sense para. 213 Discussion Paper.
33 Para. 213 Discussion Paper.
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D. Specific aspects of the discussion paper relating to IPRs
25. While the preceding comments tried to develop a more economically
consistent, IP-specific approach to the assessment of refusal-to-license
cases, it was not possible to comment more specifically on those parts
of the discussion paper in which the Commission refers to intellectual
property. The following comments are directly addressed to those parts
in order to give more immediate guidance to the Commission.
26. In para. 213, the Commission presents a very good analysis of positive
and negative effects of a duty to license on the long-term incentive
structure of the IP system. These considerations should be maintained
and could be integrated in the test suggested above (para. 24).
27. In para. 227, the Commission follows the ECJ’s argument that a poten-
tial or even hypothetical market for an IPR would be sufficient for the
assessment in the framework of a refusal to supply. The argument is
made in the context of the dominance requirement. In this context, the
Commission has to realise that the concept of a potential market does
not answer the question of whether the right holder is dominant in such
a market. External market factors like standardisation could cause
market dominance to exist only in the downstream product market; the
petitioner would in principle be able to produce or acquire an input to
compete with the IPR in question, but would not be able to use it on the
product market.
28. In para. 230, the Commission quite rightly identifies two scenarios of
indispensable IPRs, namely those in which competitors might not be
able to turn to any workable alternative technology and in which they
are unable to “invent around” the right. The Commission mentions
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technology that has become the standard as an example for the first
problem and interoperability as a requirement for entering the market
as an example for the second. Unfortunately, later parts of the discus-
sion paper do not explain how these two scenarios should be dealt with
under the “additional” new-product rule.
29. In para. 233, the Commission deals with the prevention of a new prod-
uct in a not yet existing market. Therein, the Commission seems to al-
lude to the new-product rule of the Magill and IMS Health judgments of
the ECJ. Here it should be emphasised that the new-product concept
alone does not argue for a new market. A right holder who refuses to
grant a licence in order to prevent the introduction of a new, superior
product and to serve the market with his inferior product (the Magill
situation) restrains competition in an already existing market.
30. In para. 235, the Commission develops a “defence” in favour of the
right holder according to which competition may be excluded for a cer-
tain period of time in order to allow the right holder to recover adequate
returns on his investment. This defence seems flawed for a number of
reasons. First, IP rights are usually not thought to protect investment
as such, but certain innovative and creative achievements. Secondly, it
is not the IPR itself that pays the investor but consumers who buy
products that include the protected subject-matter. According to the
theory of complementarity, the IP system should not be immunised
against competition, but, on the contrary, the relevant product market
should ideally be a competitive market so as to produce maximum in-
centives for innovation. Investment in innovation in this world of dy-
namic competition is typically risk-oriented. Whether investment by the
pharmaceutical industry in research and development, for instance,
would lead to useful, safe and marketable drugs responding to suffi-
cient consumer needs is highly uncertain. Accordingly, the IP system
only creates competitive incentives for investment, but does not guar-
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antee any compensation of the investment made. Thirdly, the argu-
ment that IPRs should grant an economic monopoly for a certain pe-
riod of time in order to allow the right holder to recoup his investment
makes allusion to the Schumpeterean concept that considers market
dominance a condition for a sufficient level of innovation. This concept
is based on a static market structure analysis and conflicts with the
modern concept of dynamic competition according to which pressure
from competition promotes the highest level of innovation. Hence, the
defence proposed by the Commission is incompatible with the overall
approach of the Commission. There is no reason why the holder of an
IP right should be able to rely on his interest in recovering adequate re-
turns on his investment to preclude intervention under Art. 82 EC,
which is designed to “re-establish” competition by substitution as the
main objective of IP law. Nevertheless, the Commission is right in
pointing out that, in order to maintain incentives to invest and innovate,
the dominant firm must not be unduly restricted in the exploitation of
valuable results of the investment. However, this consideration should
not be considered as a defence, but within the framework of balancing
the different pro- and anti-competitive effects of a duty to license (see
above paras. 23 and 24) and of fixing adequate royalties.
31. In para. 236, the Commission tends to favour a duty to supply and to
license when the investment would have been made even if the inves-
tor had known that he had to supply afterwards. As to the licensing of
IPRs, the Commission mentions the example that investment leading
to the IPRs has not been particularly significant and would have been
made anyway. Such arguments are not beyond doubt, since IPRs are
usually granted for specific achievements – inventions and creations –
and not for investment. High investment may lead to little innovation
and creativity and vice versa. Therefore, a distinction between high and
low-investment IPRs contradicts the legal decision made in the context
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of IP laws and, therefore, should not be advocated in the context of Art.
82 EC.
32. In para. 238, the Commission explains that the very aim of the exclu-
sive right is to prevent third parties from applying the IPR to produce
and distribute products without the consent of the right holder. Though
this is true from an IP perspective, para. 238 would be the right place
for the Commission to mention that by excluding imitation, IP law also
pursues the aim of inducing competitors to compete by substitution
(concept of dynamic competition).
33. We agree in substance with the statement made in para. 240, that a
duty to license may be considered in order to enable competitors to in-
vest in follow-on innovation even if the licensed technology would not
be incorporated in clearly identifiable new goods and services. Here
the Commission goes beyond a strict reading of the ECJ’s cumulative
new-product requirement and seems to accept a duty to license even
with the result of mere “short-run” imitation. However, the Commission
should clarify that such arguments of a higher level of follow-on innova-
tion are not used unfoundedly. Hence, it would be wise to place the
consideration of para. 240 within the general balancing approach tak-
ing into account all pro- and anti-competitive effects of a refusal to li-
cense (see above paras. 23 and 24). A consideration similar to para.
240 should be included with regard to a duty to license with the objec-
tive of granting competitors access to a standard.
34. In paras. 241 and 242, the Commission deals with refusal to supply
information needed for interoperability as a specific subgroup of refusal
to supply. Only in this context does the Commission refer to the con-
cept of leveraging market power to another market. It is not clear
whether there is a difference in substance between this leveraging the-
ory and the preceding parts of the discussion paper on refusal to sup-
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ply. In particular, para. 242 remains unclear as to the standard to be
applied. By pointing out that even in cases in which such information is
considered a trade secret it may not be appropriate to apply the same
high standards for intervention as those described in the previous sub-
section, the Commission seems to understand the leveraging approach
as a less strict standard. Maybe, in para. 242, the Commission alludes
to the stricter standard of intervention in IP cases. It is true that trade
secrets should not be considered an exclusive right comparable to
IPRs. Trade secrets only enjoy protection under contract and tort law
and are not thought as such to promote innovation. In cases in which
the information needed for interoperability is protected by IPRs, there is
no reason not to apply the general rules concerning refusal to license.
35. Intellectual property rights often play a role in controlling access to so-
called aftermarkets for complementary goods. The Commission deals
with these markets in the last part of its discussion paper in paras. 243-
265. In several parts of this section, the Commission refers to IPRs.
The overall question is which test applies in situations in which the right
holder refuses to license the IPR to a competitor with the objective of
excluding this competitor from the aftermarket: the more stringent test
on refusal to license an IPR, or the specific test relating to aftermar-
kets. In para. 264, the Commission seems to adopt the second view.
There, the Commission presumes that it is abusive for a dominant
company to reserve the aftermarket for itself by excluding competitors
from that market. As one example of such exclusive behaviour, the
Commission mentions the refusal to license an intellectual property
right. Whereas the Commission does not seem to require the stricter
approach to refusal to license in these circumstances, it is quite ques-
tionable whether such a rule would be consistent with the case-law of
the ECJ. For instance, in Volvo, the ECJ rejected a general duty to li-
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cense a design right for spare parts under Art. 82 EC.34 We recom-
mend that the Commission apply the same analytical framework of re-
fusal to license to cases in which the right holder excludes competition
in aftermarkets. In sum, a duty to license should rely on a complete as-
sessment of the pro- and anti-competitive effects of such a duty in the
specific case.
34 Case 238/87, Volvo, [1995] ECR 6211, para. 8 et seq.
